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INTRODUCTION

The problem of accountability of public officials and public agencies is one of the
most difficult in democratic theory and practice.1 While it is recognized that
democratic governments, if they are to accomplish their mandates, must be allocated
certain authority, it is equally recognized that the government and its officials can
abuse this power. The tensions created by the need to allocate governmental power
without eroding governmental responsiveness are manifest in two important respects. On the one hand, abuse of governmental power may jeopardize the individual liberty of a citizen or group of citizens. On the other hand, the possibility
that usurpers of power will rule arbitrarily without regard for the will of the
governed has concerned citizens and students of American democracy since the
days of the founding fathersY
Over the past decade criticism of the procedures and practices of bureaucracies
providing municipal services has increased. A number of programs and policies have
been recommended and enacted that would help to maintain a balance between
governmental bureaucratic power and bureaucratic responsiveness. Among these
policies have been the establishment of legal services for the poor,' demands for
community control of schools and police,4 "maximum feasible participation" in
poverty programs,5 and police review boards.6 While the subject of this article is
police review boards, it should be clear that the importance of accountability to clients
and citizens is not unique to the police. As a report to the President's Commission
on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice put the issue:
Incompetence and mistreatment by housing, sanitation, health and welfare officials
can be as injurious to citizens as mistreatment by police and should be equally
subject to public scrutiny. These officials, like policemen, are public servants.7
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Current interest in the accountability of public bureaucracies has been stimulated
particularly by the civil rights movement, which challenged the traditional relationship between the public bureaucracy and its citizen-clients In the field of social
welfare, for example, there has been a distinct movement on the part of clients
and client organizations to change their image from that of supplicants to that of
rights-bearing citizensY Clients are no longer willing to accept the traditional
relationship as the only possible one. While at one time the client accepted the
definition of himself provided by the agency, which usually emphasized his dependency, the new position is that the client is a capable individual who may, indeed, have some knowledge that the agency does not have about his needs and
how to meet them.' ° The redefinition of client-agency relationships is not restricted
to social welfare agencies, but is a general prototype for agencies that serve the
public.
While the civil rights movement called attention to actual and potential abuse of
government authority in certain cases, a concurrent recognition of a tremendous
spread in the scope of government power revived concern about mechanisms for
insuring retention of sovereignty by the people. Reich," commenting on the role
of government in general, demonstrates that it is in a position to allocate various
kinds of wealth. "To the individual, these new forms, such as a profession, job, or
right to receive income, are the basis of his various statuses in society, and may
therefore be the most meaningful and distinctive wealth he possesses."1 Government
services at all levels play an increasingly central part in the lives of members of our
society. For many, government may be the only source of housing, education,
medical services, and income, and thus relations with the agencies that dispense these
services become critical for the individual. The elimination of alternative sources of
income and services makes the actions of public agencies subject to closer scrutiny
than they were when government was more restricted.
The extension of governmental power over the lives of citizens has accelerated
at the same time that public bueaucracies have increased their control over governmental policy. This change can be traced in part to efforts to create a professional,
nonpartisan civil service. Beginning with the progressive reform movement in the
late x9 th century, American cities were reorganized to divorce public agencies
from potentially corrupting direct political influence. Elaborate civil service regulations and procedures were instituted to insure politically nonpartisan bureaus
staffed by career civil servants committed to public service. In the process, both
the public and elected officials lost a good deal of the control that they once had over
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the operations of public agencies. As a result, Lowi writes: "The modern city is
now well run but badly governed because it is now composed of islands of functional
power before which the modern mayor stands impoverished."' 3
As the people and the politicians were losing control over public agencies, the
government employees themselves acquired considerable autonomy in the internal
operations of their bureaus. Sometimes, but not always, this power was obtained on
the basis of technical expertise or professional status. Furthermore, the efforts of
public employees to improve their own conditions of employment, to increase their
economic security, and to improve or expand services to the public have generated
major political issues. These activities have been spearheaded by strong unions and
employee associations using many of the traditional strategies of the labor movement including strikes, picketing, petitions, and mass demonstrations. Like other
public employees, associations of policemen have been active in shaping events.
They have influenced the course of campaigns for police accountability in several
cities, including New York and Philadelphia. Their activities were similar to those
of hospital workers, welfare workers, teachers, firemen and garbage collectors who,
involved with public bureaucracy as both employees and citizens, have been active
in many communities.
I
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A number of arguments have been raised about the responsiveness of channels
of police accountability other than review boards. The issue is not whether municipal
police departments should be in no respect accountable to the community; instead
the dispute forms around the question of whether existing accountability measures
make a department sufficiently responsive in the absence of a police review board. The
extensive published literature on this issue runs the gamut of style from presidential
commission reports and academic journals to the popular press and propaganda
pamphlets. Those who support the existing system are drawn mainly from the
ranks of policemen's mutual aid organizations, police officials, and conservative
groups. Their strongest opposition has come from civil rights and civil liberties
organizations and from the report of the Kern.er Commission.
A. The Crisis Over the Legitimacy of Police Practices
Those who see a need to redress the balance between power and responsiveness
in municipal police departments cite evidence of a general loss of confidence among
large segments of the population in police operations and in the effectiveness of
departmental procedures for review of police conduct. The Kerner Commission
report, in its analysis of the sources of civil disorders, lists among the causes of
black hostility toward the police "the almost total lack of effective channels for
redress of complaints against police conduct."' 4
18
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The police are not perceived as impartial, neutral enforcers of the law, par-

ticularly by the citizens of ghetto neighborhoods. Instead of contributing to the
solution of problems plaguing society, the police are thought to exacerbate them."8
The tensions that exist between the police and some citizens reduce the likelihood
that those citizens will be willing to accept current accountability procedures as fair
or adequate. Until this lack of confidence is overcome, belief in police responsiveness
has been destroyed for many citizens. The generalized lack of confidence is buttressed by experiences with specific police department review systems. Coxe, for
example, claims that for sixteen years prior to the creation' of a civilian review
board in Philadelphia, "there was to the knowledge of the American Civil Liberties
Union, not one instance of the Police Department's disciplining a member of the
force because of a wrong done to a civilian, on the complaint of a civilian.""'0 It is

asserted that in some communities police commanders will simply refuse to accept
any complaint from ghetto residents3T
An obvious alternative channel of redress for citizens who feel that policemen
have violated their rights is the appropriate local, state, or federal court. In response,
Beral and Sisk contend that the relationship between the police and the district
attorney's office is often symbiotic, "and prosecutors may well be reluctant to
jeopardize their relations with the police, on whose cooperation they often rely."18
Furthermore, litigation is an expensive and time-consuming process which the nature
of the grievance may not warrant.
Although a complaint may not justify court action, to the aggrieved citizen
it may seem sufficiently important to require some official settlement. A grievance
unresolved remains a constant source of antagonism between the police and the
citizen. If the citizen is frustrated in obtaining redress, his anger and hostility are
compounded. Advocates speak frequently about the safety-valve component of external review procedures. Pointing out that "a number of aggrieved complainants
are not interested in having disciplinary action taken against the offending officer, but
merely request an apology and a statement that their rights will be respected in the
future," the Fourth Annual Report of the Philadelphia Police Advisory Board concludes that "no longer is it necessary for a citizen who felt himself wronged by police
actions to harbor resentment within himself, or to spread his hostile feelings throughout the community."'"
In reply to the above claims which question the responsiveness of the police
organization to citizens, supporters of existing channels of redress invoke the concept of the professional status of law enforcement officers. Organizations such as
18
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the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) insist that, as in any profession, discipline of police officers comes properly and most effectively from fellow
members of the profession. ° Even if professional status is not granted, it may be
argued that from an organizational point of view the responsibility for discipline of
policemen should be placed within the command structure itself. It is contended that
the basis of police accountability to the community should be the procedures of the
department since the commander is either elected by the people or appointed by responsible officials. While law enforcement officers concede that they do not always
perform according to the standards of their profession or rules of their organizations,
they assert that effective remedies for misconduct are available within the departmental structure. If those within the command structure "are held accountable for
inexcusable failures to detect and discipline offenders, they can eliminate much of
the behavior that now brings police establishments into disrepute." '1
Some investigators have concluded that existing internal review and investigation
procedures are not necessarily inadequate. A report to the Mayor of Chicago from
a citizens' committee to study police-community relations states that the techniques
of the Internal Investigation Division of the Chicago Police Department "are adequate to insure that each complaint against a police officer is thoroughly and objectively investigated."22 Nor did this study find any instance where police engaged
in efforts to cover up an investigation. "Indeed, such a 'cover-up' would be unlikely,
if not impossible, due to the sophisticated system of checking and cross-checking
of the progress of each investigation."
The IACP has similarly concluded that procedures short of civilian review
boards will provide adequate public accountability. While advocating formal
machinery for the investigation of complaints as "an absolute necessity" for every
police department, the organization identifies the alternatives available to citizens
dissatisfied with the outcome of internal review. 4 At the local level, elected officials,
civil and criminal courts, and the local prosecutors are possible avenues of appeal.
The FBI, the Justice Department, and various civil rights commissions are also
described as "well-established, competent and authorized institutions of legal
redress. ' 25
The supporters of the police organization save their strongest words and most
extensive arguments for justifying opposition to civilian-dominated police review

boards. The debate over the desirability of review boards to enhance the accountability of the police is the subject of a subsequent section.
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B. Characteristics of Civilian Review Boards
The organization and operation of civilian review boards are not standardized
either in practice or theory. Some common characteristics can, however, be identified
in proposals for review mechanisms. For example, it is usually proposed that
these organizations be staffed by civilians who will operate outside the jurisdiction
of police departments but who are authorized to recommend the disciplining of
police officers. It has been suggested that to be effective such organizations must
utilize a simple complaint procedure and have a staff adequate to insure prompt
and thorough investigations of all complaints. In addition, the organization should
allow the complainant to participate in investigations, hearings, or conciliation
procedures and notify him of the outcome of the deliberations.26
In comparing four civilian review boards that were operating at the time of the
study, a report to the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice noted that these boards "have been advisory only, having no power
to decide cases " 2' The advice can vary. For example, in Philadelphia and Rochester
the advice could include recommendations for disciplinary action, but in New York
City and Washington, D.C., the review boards "even lacked the power to indicate
their views on the merits of the case, being limited to recommending whether a police
trial was necessary or not."2 In the operational details, further variations occurred.
Some boards had subpoena power, whereas others did not. Representation by counsel
was always allowed, and provision for counsel for indigent complainants was made
by three of the four boards. Although only one board opened its hearings to the
public, each board had some type of hearing procedure. There were also arrangements by each of these boards for informal methods of settlement. No board had
an investigating staff composed of non-police personnel, although in one case an
investigating staff was attached to the board.2 9
The composition of review boards is yet another matter. Since the demand for
civilian review was stimulated in part by alleged police misconduct against minority
group members, the question of the ethnic composition of these boards has been
raised. While in neither New York City nor Philadelphia was there an official policy
as to the distribution of board membership, the practice was to obtain representation
of ethnic minority groups 0 Philadelphia always had an academician with a background in criminology or sociology. The question of police representation has been
solved in several ways. In New York City, three of the seven members of the board
were police personnel;8 1 in other cities former police officers have been appointed.
8
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C. The Case Against Civilian Review
The opposition of law enforcement officers to police review boards made up of
civilians is founded on a basic tenet of their professional standards-that jurisdiction over the discipline of members of a police force belongs exclusively with the
command structure. Because review boards tend to interfere with this jurisdiction,
it is felt that they undermine the authority of the police command. That the boards
in every case known to this investigator have been only advisory with respect to
police discipline, and that the power to determine sanctions against an officer remains
within his department is disregarded by police supporters. Having to answer to
anyone outside the traditional framework of government, such as, grand juries,
civil service commissions, or departmental disciplinary bodies, is repugnant to the
officers. Opponents of civilian review insist that adherence to the principle of
departmental jurisdiction over discipline is necessary to preserve the morale, effectiveness, and efficiency of a law enforcement organization. The public expects the police
to act quickly and decisively in critical situations. Willingness to do so depends upon
the line officer's belief that, whenever his actions are questioned and reviewed, those
who do so must be knowledgeable about police practices. That belief contributes
greatly to high morale on the force, and morale is a fundamental component of an
effective police organization. 2
It is asserted that review boards staffed by laymen will severely threaten morale.
As a consequence, police officers will feel restrained from taking necessary and
justifiable actions. This contention has received support from the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation who, in his report on the 1964 riots in Philadelphia,
claimed that the presence of a civilian board in that city "was well known in the
community and the rioters was thereby emboldened to resist and completely defy the
efforts of the police to restore order. In short, the police were so careful to avoid
accusations of improper conduct that they were virtually paralyzed."33 In response,
it has been pointed out that a policy of police restraint in order to save lives was
consciously undertaken by a number of municipal authorities, including those in
Philadelphia 4 Furthermore, the many reports following the urban riots of the
mid-i96o's contain no data to the effect that the severity or duration of the disorder
or the nature of official response to it was any different in cities in which there were
civilian review boards than in cities in which there were noneY5
The attack on civilian! review boards often extends to specific objections about
procedures and practices. One allegation is that police review boards, while resembling courts of law, do not provide certain vital procedural safeguards0 6 Civilian
review boards do not always observe rules of evidence when hearing a case. The
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boards are "often referred to as being 'kangaroo courts.' This descriptive term has
been used because such boards deprive the police officer of his basic constitutionally
guaranteed rights, e.g., to face his accuser, representation by counsel, and protection
against double jeopardy.""7 But it must be recalled that hearings in the four cities
mentioned previously were not trials; rather they constituted administrative procedures where the goal was to obtain information on which to base a decision
about whether subsequent formal action was warranted. Furthermore, both police
officers and complainants might be represented by counsel.
Civilian review boards have been criticized for their willingness to entertain minor
complaints. Opponents assert that this results in a waste of time, money, and resources
of the police department that could otherwise be spent on the more significant
aspects of law enforcement s It is contended that methods are needed to screen out
complaints that are trivial or unfounded.
Finally, it is suggested that the creation of civilian review boards will not contribute to reducing community tensions, as those who support them claim, but
instead will be deleterious to police-community relations in general. In a sophisticated argument, Gellhorn maintains that "the review system presupposes a polarization-the complainant (and, behind him, the disadvantaged ethnic minority) on one
side, the accused policeman (and behind him the policeman's mutual aid organization) on the other-that almost inescapably makes for extremely burdensome procedures." 9 To create symbols of disunity, to encourage polarization can only contribute to the crisis; it does not contribute to a solution. Proponents of the boards,
of course, would respond that the polarization is already sharp in many communities
and cannot be wished away or ignored; by offering a new channel of reconciliation,
civilian complaint review boards may ease strong antagonisms.
II
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A comparison of two civilian review boards which received national attention, the
New York City Civilian Complaint Review Board (CCRB) and the Philadelphia
Police Advisory Board (PAB) will provide concrete examples of the structure and
operation of civilian-run boards. Both of these boards were also subjects of political
controversies that ultimately led to their abolition; the comparison on this dimension
permits some consideration of the feasibility of civilian review boards as a mechanism
for police accountability.
A. New York City
The Civilian Complaint Review Board, as a citizen-dominated commission, lasted
only four months between July and November 1966. But as a part of the structure
87d.
83
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of New York City's Police Department, the CCRB has a history dating from the
early i95o's.4° At that time a grand jury investigation of a case of alleged police
brutality and other information about police misconduct created pressure for the
creation of machinery for the consideration of citizens' complaints. In 1953 a Civilian
Complaint Review Board was established within the police department.
The Police Commissioner appointed three Deputy Commissioners to the Board.
None was a member of the uniformed force and all were located administratively
within the Community Relations Division. The Board's responsibility was to review
reports prepared by commanding officers of the policemen whom civilians had
charged with unnecessary or excessive use of force or abuse of authority. The Board
conducted no hearings; the members simply recommended actions to the Police
Commissioner on the basis of the reports they received. The Police Commissioner
took these recommendations as advisory and was not bound by the decision of the
Board.
Approximately ten years later, this arrangement was subjected to substantial
criticism as civil rights and civil liberties groups became more concerned with police
treatment of minority groups in general and their action during riots and demonstrations in particular. A Democratic city councilman, reacting to police conduct
during a peace demonstration, introduced legislation in 1964 to establish a police
review board outside the police department. The matter was referred to a subcommittee of the Council for study. A year later majority and minority committee
reports were presented. The majority found no need to change the existing structure for review of citizen complaints against the police and concurred with the
police position that an external review board would decrease department morale
and efficiency.
But by the time these reports were published, the matter of civilian review had
become a controversial political issue. In the 1965 mayoral campaign, John V.
Lindsay, the Republican candidate, promised that, if elected, he would change the
composition and structure of the Civilian Complaint Review Board. He presented
his plans for civilian review in his first major policy speech on May 2i, 1965, only
days after the City Council reports were made public. Hearings on the bill before
the full Council generated further controversy. The Patrolmen's Benevolent Association (PBA) was able to mobilize a force of five thousand off-duty policemen to
picket City Hall on June 29, during the hearings, and to collect over 5o0,ooo signatures on petitions protesting any form of outside review.
The incumbent Police Commissioner defended the police department's method
of handling civilian complaints at the hearings and opposed any outside review plan.
His position reflected the professional view of police administration that discipline
is the responsibility of the Police Commissioner and not that of the Mayor or the
City Council. The Commissioner offered plans to alter some of the practices of the
" The history of civilian review in New York City follows the presentation found in E. Kaplovitz,
The Civilian Review Board, May 16, 1967 (unpublished senior essay, Government, Barnard College).
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existing Civilian Complaint Review Board and eventually ordered substantial changes
in the structure and operations of the Board 1 But the issue had grown beyond
the question of administrative reform.
Lindsay's election determined the outcome of the civilian review issue. None
of the several bills that had been introduced in the City Council were passed. The
PBA remained vigorously opposed to any form of outside review, and the Police
Commissioner stood firm in his opposition. What had started out as a debate

within City Council had moved to the public domain during the campaign and
and now became an administrative decision for the Mayor. A task force report
on the police that Lindsay had commissioned recommended a civilian review board.
Lindsay made his position dear; he was going to have an outside review board even
if it meant a new Police Commissioner.
When the term of the incumbent Commissioner expired, the new Mayor appointed another iman, Howard R. Leary, who had been Police Commissioner in
Philadelphia. The rules and procedures governing civilian complaints were amended
by the new Commissioner, effective June 30, 1966; and the civilian-dominated CCRB
was established.4 The Mayor appointed four citizens and the Commissioner appointed three high-ranking police officers.
Under the amended rules, the CCRB was authorized
to investigate and to review allegations of misconduct by members of the department involving:
a. Unnecessary or excessive use of force
b. Abuse of authority (includes unreasonable action taken in an official capacity
which deprives individuals of rights guaranteed by law)
c. Discourtesy, or abusive or insulting language
d. Language, conduct, or behavior which is derogatory of a person's race, religion,
creed, or national origin.43
Incidents that fell outside the jurisdiction of the CCRB, but that were still matters
for police investigation, were forwarded to the Office of the Chief Inspector.
The PBA immediately announced organization of the Independent Citizens Committee Against Police Review Boards (ICC). At the same time another organization, FAIR (Federated Associations for Impartial Review), began a campaign to
counter the efforts of the PBA. The PBA had not been successful in blocking the
civilian-dominated review board in the courts, but it was determined to bring the
issue to the voters as a referendum question. After some legal skirmishing with
city officials, the question was placed on the ballot for November 1966.
The John Birch Society, the Conservative Party, American Legion Posts, and
many other groups joined the PBA and the ICC opposing civilian review. On

the other side, the liberal establishment of the city was amply represented by the
"'New York, N.Y., Police Dep't, General Orders No. 28, Amendments to the Rules and Procedures,
Sept. 13, 1965.
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New York City American Civil Liberties Union, the American Jewiseh Committee,
and the Liberal Party, in addition to FAIR. The opposing forces were not equally
financed. The PBA pledged to use its entire treasury of 1.5 million dollars in the
campaign, if necessary. The initial budget of the ICC was $5oo,ooo with $2ooooo
earmarked for television and radio advertising. FAIR, on the other hand, spent less
than $120,000.

The battle over referendum votes was bitterly fought. The campaign in favor of
the question (thus, opposed to civilian review) carried overtones of racial hostility and
fear of an increase in crime. It was the law-abiding, white citizen who would be
threatened if the police were constrained by civilian review. The result of the voting
reflected these concerns. The voters supported the referendum abolishing civiliandominated police review by a margin of more than three-to-one. The issue was
successful in white, middle-class neighborhoods and ethnic enclaves. The vote4
favoring civilian review was concentrated in black and Puerto Rican neighborhoods
B. Philadelphia
The Philadelphia Police Advisory Board (PAB) grew out of a strong movement
for municipal government reform. After sixty-seven years of Republican control,
a reform Democratic administration took office in 1952. The Republican administration had been marked by allegations of corruption. As early as 19o4, Lincoln
Steffens characterized Philadelphia as a corrupt and contented city! 5 The police were
deeply entrenched in the political organization.40 District commands, for example,
were allegedly often filled on the recommendation of the local party chieftain.
Therefore, one of the goals of the reform movement was to rebuild the police department. Although an able new commissioner was appointed, the department could
not have been expected to improve significantly in a short period of time. Even after
several years of reform administration, Reichley reported that a "discouragingly large
number of police are bought outright with bribes directly to the police officers
''4
involved. T
In the late i95o's the City Council's Committee on Law Enforcement and Government opened hearings to investigate alleged illegal search and seizure operations in
a police department attack on numbers writing!' Civil rights and civil liberties
organizations took advantage of the opportunity afforded by the hearings to bring
up other instances of police misconduct. The ACLU, for example, presented information gathered over the years concerning alleged abuses, particularly those that
the organization felt had not received proper attention from the police department.!'
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These organizations focused on the inadequacy of measures for redress of civilian
grievances against the police and advocated establishment of a police review board.
Efforts by some City Councilman to secure passage of a bill creating a civilian
review board were frustrated, but Mayor Richardson Dilworth, sympathetic to the
idea and its supporters, used the power of his position to establish such a board.
On October 1, 1958, he appointed five men to the Philadelphia Police Review Board.
To these five men he gave the following mandate:
This Board was charged with the responsibility of considering citizens' complaints
against the police where the charge involved brutality, false arrest, discrimination
based upon race, religion or national origin, or other wrongful conduct of police
personnel toward citizens.0
From its inception the PAB faced opposition from the Fraternal Order of Police
(FOP), a benevolent association which acts as the spokesman and bargaining agent
for policeimen in Philadelphia. The FOP maintained continuing opposition, highlighted by two suits filed to enjoin the operation of the Board. The first, filed late
in I959, was withdrawn when the Board agreed to a few modest reforms. The second
complaint, filed in 1965, was in litigation for four years and helped to produce the
Board's eventual demise.
The Board's problems were not derived solely from the opposition of the FOP.
Vacancies on the Board or in the position of Executive Secretary were not always
filled promptly by Mayor Tate who succeeded Mayor Dilworth. Tate was not a
reformer, but a loyal member of the regular Democratic organization that had begun
to replace the reformers in a number of city offices. In 1963, he replaced the first
Executive Secretary, a very outspoken liberal, with a man who was less hiilitant.
Upon the latter's resignation, the Mayor took five months to name a replacement;
this resulted in a hiatus in Board activities. The next Executive Secretary, the third
and last in the history of the PAB and a regular Democrat, proved to be very
effective in the office until 1967 when the second suit brought by the FOP resulted
in an injunction suspending PAB hearings.51 While it was possible to appeal that
decision, the City Solicitor's Office did not move promptly. Advocates of the PAB,
including the civil rights and civil liberties organizations that had been active in its
creation, were dissatisfied but decided to refrain from any pressure for appeal until
after the forthcoming mayoral campaign.
Like many others in the second half of the i96o's, the 1967 election campaign in

Philadelphia had a strong undercurrent of concern about white backlash and a very
strong emphasis on law and order. The incumbent Mayor faced an up-hill fight.
He entered as an underdog and without complete control of the local party organization. By very clever strategy he was able to gain the support of those concerned with
law and order without losing the black vote. Although not a strong adovcate of
[1959] PA., PHILADELPHIA POLICE ADvIsORy BD. ANN. REP. (0
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civilian review, Mayor Tate had indicated his support for the PAB on several
occasions. Since his opponent was also known to favor the PAB, PAB supporters
decided not to politicize the issue. A hardening of opposition to the PAB might
have forced the incumbent to side with that opposition if he had thought they held
the balance in the election.
When Mayor Tate was re-elected, those who favored the PAB became impatient. The Mayor gave no indication that he was going to press for an appeal
of the earlier unfavorable court decision, and the PAB remained inactive for several
months. In a move calculated to force action by the Mayor or the City Solicitor's
Office, members of the PAB retained two prominent Philadelphia attorneys to represent them in appealing the case. This action was found to violate a provision of the
city charter prohibiting city employees from taking independent legal action in such
cases. Nevertheless, the attempt did have the desired effect. At a Mayor's cabinet
meeting in early 1969, the decision was made to proceed with the appeal.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania ruled in favor of the PAB, but the Board
was not reactivated. 52 The Mayor, out of the country at the time of the decision,
asserted in a telephone interview that there was "no reason for haste in re-activating
the Police Advisory Board." 3 He announced that upon his return he would
consult with various members of his administration, and in particular with Police
Commissioner Rizzo. The outcome of those consultations was obvious to most
observers. The City Council President stated flatly: "If he [Tate] waits for me he
will never reactivate it. I was against it at the beginning and I'm against it now.""S
The hostility of the Police Commissioner to the PAB was already public knowledge.
The Mayor announced his decision in a speech before one hundred members of
the police command. In terminating the PAB, the Mayor stated: "This is a type
of a Christmas present to you gentlemen."'55
Political observers in Philadelphia were convinced that the Mayor was responding
to the wishes of his Police Commissioner, who was gaining political power in the
city.5" If politics for years had encroached upon the police organization, it now
looked as though the police were encroaching upon politics. This interpretation
gained further support when Commissioner Rizzo subsequently and successfully
ran for Mayor of Philadelphia with the the support of Mayor Tate.
C. Comparisons
Both the CCRB and the PAB were products of liberal reform politics. Each was
established at a time of public concern over excessive force and denial of civil rights
by policemen. There were, however, some important differences. The PAB was born
in a period of great sympathy for policies meant to assist minority groups. This sym52 Id.

" The Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), June 28, x969, at z, col. 8.
"lThe Evening Bulletin (Philadelphia), July jo, 1969, at 34, col. 3.
Philadelphia Inquirer, Dec. 13, x969, at z.
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pathy began to deteriorate as the decade of the i96o's progressed; urban politicians
became concerned over backlash and were unwilling to be as progressive as they once
were. The civilian review board in New York City was proposed when these feelings

were extraordinarily intense, and the campaign waged against it exploited these
feelings.
In Philadelphia, the creation of a civilian review board was one of a number of
reforms introduced to improve the efficiency and responsibility of city government
after more than a half century of desultory, one-party rule. To some extent, there
was consensus among the public, the elected officials, and the police command that
reforms were needed. The Police Commissioner, himself a reform appointee, was
not publicly upset over the prospect of civilian review. Several police commissioners who served later during the PAB's history cooperated with the Board and
did not publicly criticize it. Until the appointment of Commissioner Rizzo in 1967,
the FOP could not claim, as the PBA did in New York City, that the Mayor had
disregarded the advice of a competent Police Commissioner.
In New York City, on the other hand, civilian review was introduced as a
political issue in the 1965 mayoral campaign. Lindsay clearly hoped to win support
from a constituency that regarded the police with mistrust. But in New York City,
in contrast to Philadelphia, the issue divided those who carried the responsibility for
law enforcement. On one side were the police themselves, the command structure,
and the mutual aid organization, the PBA. On the other side was a man who, first
as a candidate and then as Mayor, doubted the police department's ability to redress
citizen grievances.
Just as similar considerations lay behind the appointments of these two Boards,
the political decisions which brought their defeats were based upon similar sentiments.
The opposition in both cities was a well-mobilized interest group. The associations
of policemen were deeply concerned and threatened by civilian review of the police.
The PAB was a constant source of irritation for the Philadelphia policeman. It
never lost its importance as an occupational problem.
Supporters of civilian review were never as single-minded in their dedication to
maintaining it as the police were to defeating it. The review board issue was one

among many that occupied public interest and resources. But even more importantly,
those who would benefit imost from civilian review were a very fragmented constituency. It is harder to form an alliance among those with a potential problem than
it is among those facing an immediate threat.
THE SucrUcT-R

AND OPEmATIONS oF

Two CVmIAN REviEw BoAns

The previous sections have raised the general issue of accountability of public
bureaucracies, discussed how this issue has been debated with regard to police

review boards, and reviewed the political history of two boards. Attention is now
directed toward the functioning of these two boards, the New York City Civilian
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Complaint Review Board, when it was dominated by civilians, and the Philadelphia

Police Advisory Board. The first three parts of the section will present details about
the boards-their structures, operations, actions and recommendations, and a

portrait of the complaints. A final part summarizes selected comparisons between
them and highlights problems inherent in civilian review as a means of insuring
accountability.
A. Operations
i.New York City
The CCRB operated according to orders of the Police Commissioner specifying
its function, rules, and procedures. t An administrative staff of civilians and an investigating unit of police officers carried on the day-to-day work of the Board.
Heading this staff were civilian appointees of the Police Commissioner to the offices
of Executive Director and Assistant Director. The Assistant Director was in charge
of conciliation procedures; the civilian staff included two hearing officers. A member of the police force above the rank of captain was assigned to direct the activities
of the full-time investigating unit. The chief task of the seven-member Board itself
was to review investigations and hearing records and to decide whether to recommend to the Commissioner that departmental charges be preferred against an officer.
Board members appointed by the Mayor received fifty dollars for each hearing or
meeting attended.r8
The Commissioner's order stated that: "Complaints may be filed by any interested
person or group. Complaints shall be accepted in writing, in person, or by telephone,
whether or not the complainant offers his name."59 The CCRB's machinery was set
in motion on receipt of a complaint, either directly as presented by the complainant
or as transmitted by any member of the department. Once the CCRB had received
a complaint and determined that it fell within the jurisdiction of the Board, the
staff would proceed in one of two ways. If the Assistant Director decided that the
incident could be settled by conciliation, this approach was pursued. If such a settlement was not possible, the staff of police officers assigned to the CCRB began an
investigation of the incident. When an investigation was completed and returned
to the administrative staff, the Board determined whether a hearing should be held
and whether the Board should be represented at that hearing. Under the rules, a
hearing was to be held within twenty days after receipt of the investigation report.
Both the complainant and the accused policeman were to be informed of the time
and place of the hearing. Hearings could not take place at a station houseY0 All
parties were to be notified that they could be represented by counsel. If financial
8

General Orders No. 14.

Id. at 3.
'lid. at 6.

" Id.
at z5.

i

LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

problems prevented either a complainant .or a policeman from hiring an attorney,
the Board was instructed to find suitable counsel at no expense to the Board.01
Hearings were conducted by a hearing officer. When Board members were
designated to represent the Board, they were to be an odd-numbered panel of one
to seven individuals with the stipulation that the "majority of each panel shall
consist of members appointed by the Mayor," 2 that is, civilian members. Hearings
were not open to the public; but they were open to complainants, the accused, and
a limited number of individuals representing them. The Board had access to subpoena power through the Police Commissioner, which could be used "to compel the
attendance at a hearing of witnesses or the production of evidence.""4 Requests for
issuance of a subpoena could be made on the hearing officer's approval by any
member of the CCRB representing it at a hearing, by the hearing officer, or by a
complainant or a policeman against whom a complaint had been made." Formal
rules of evidence did not apply; the hearing officer was empowered to rule on the
relevancy of questions. Transcripts of hearings were made available at cost to the
principal parties.
2. Philzdelphia
In contrast to the highly bureaucratic methods 6f handling citizen complaints
in New York City, the Philadelphia Police Advisory Board followed a less structured format The Board, originally composed of five members, was later expanded
to eight positions. Members served without compensation."6 The Mayor of Philadelphia made appointments to the Board and gave it his mandate, but he did not
prescribe any rules, regulations, or procedures. Initially, there was neither a budget
nor provision for office space or secretarial and administrative assistance. As the
work load of the PAB increased, a part-time Executive Secretary was hired.07 Subsequently, the position was anade full-time, and the Board was given clerical help
and office space. 8 In the last full year of its operation, 1966, the Board was allocated
$i7,ooo from the city budget to cover salaries and expenses.
The generality of their duties, combined with the absence of well-defined rules
and procedures, made the Board proceed cautiously in its initial work. The records
suggest, and those close to the Board at that time confirm, that the members were
careful to specify the scope of jurisdiction and rules of operation within the limitations imposed by the Mayor's authorization and their lack of resources. In its
initial cases, the PAB determined on an individual basis how they would be handled.
01
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By the end of the first year, however, it had adopted a standard set of rules and
procedures.6 9 The initial codification was done by an attorney on the Board with
the assistance of an interested law student; it served with some modifications for
as long as the Board existed. 70 It is important to note that in contrast to those in New
York City, the rules of the PAB lacked the advantage, insofar as the police department was concerned, of having been issued as a directive from the Police Commissioner.
The regulations and procedures conveyed the Mayor's mandate to investigate
police misconduct. "The term 'misconduct' shall include, but not be limited to,
mistreatment, abusive language, false arrest, unreasonable or unwarranted use of
force, unreasonable search and seizures, denial of civil rights or discrimination because of race or religion or national origin. 71 Cases were accepted from individuals
only-no groups or organizations could file complaints, as they could in New York
City-nor could the complainant remain anonymous. A case would be terminated
if the complainant decided to withdraw the complaint. The rules stated that,
with some exceptions, a complaint must be filed within ninety days of the alleged
incident.
Because the PAB had no investigating staff, it utilized the Philadelphia Police
Department Community Relations Unit for investigating incidents. This arrangement severely limited the effectiveness of the PAB since the quality and promptness
of the investigations varied widelyy2 No power of subpoena was granted the PAB,
either directly or indirectly. Once an investigation had been completed, the PAB
determined whether a public hearing was warranted. Even if the 73PAB concluded
that a hearing was unnecessary, the complainant could request one.
Although informal settlements were not mentioned in the rules, the Executive
Secretary developed a number of settlement arrangements as alternatives to a formal
investigation and hearing. These included explaining police actions to citizens,
obtaining a letter of apology from either the officer involved or the Community
Relations Unit of the Police Department, informing the complainant that his case
lacked substance, expungement of the complainant's police record, or holding a conference among the contending parties.74 The administrative strategies for settlement
became an issue between Board members and the Executive Secretary because the
Board believed that the Executive Secretary sometimes acted beyond his authority.
A revision of the rules clarified the situation, giving the Board final jurisdiction
over case settlement.Y5 Some cases became moot when the Police Commissioner, on
Coxe, supra note
G9
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hearing of an incident, took direct action either before the investigation was completed
or before the PAB held a hearing.
Hearings were conducted by a panel of Board members; a minimum of three
was required.7 6 No formal records or transcripts of these hearings were kept. Witnesses, police officers, and complainants testified under oath and were subject to
cross-examination. The rules of evidence did not apply at hearings. Each side
had the right to counsel, but in practice, policemen were usually represented by the
Fraternal Order of Police, and citizens had no representation. The PAB recognized
that this posed a problem. It stated in its Fifth Annual Report that "when a complainant is unrepresented by counsel, and the Board must consequently play an active
role in developing the complainant's case, the appearance of impartiality is impaired,
and police respect for the Board is weakened." 77 To eliminate this weakness, a group
of lawyers was recruited to be available to represent PAB complainants on a voluntary basis.
B. Actions Based on Hearings
Upon completion of a hearing in New York City, the various documents were
reviewed by the Board in order to ascertain whether a recommendation should be
made to the Police Commissioner. A recommendation specified only that it was the
opinion of the CCRB that charges should be preferred against the offending officer.
"The recommendations of the Board shall be advisory only and shall in no way limit
the authority of the Police Commissioner to dispense discipline within the department."7 8 As in other disciplinary cases, the Police Commissioner had at his disposal machinery for departmental hearings to consider the evidence for disciplinary
action against the police officers.
No notation of CCRB proceedings was to appear in the official file of any police
officer involved. This was true whether or not the Board recommended that the
Police Commissioner act on the complaint.79 Notice of disposition of a complaint by
the Police Commissioner was sent by registered mail to both complainants and
police officers."0 When charges were preferred, however, there was no provision for
informing the complainant of the final outcome of any disciplinary action.
Unlike the CCRB, the PAB did recommend specific disciplinary action, including reprimand, suspension, or dismissal 8 1 Occasionally, the Board recommended
commendation of the officer for his performance during an incident. All recommendations were strictly advisory to the Police Commissioner, who had final
authority in disciplinary matters. In almost all cases, however, the PAB's recommendations apparently were followed. The complainant, but not the policeman,
78 Id., exhibit A,at 4.
77 1963 ANN. REP. at 2.
" General Orders No. 14 at x8-19.
"' Id. at xg.
sold.
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was sent a letter stating the Board's recommendation. Neither the PAB nor the
complainant was informed of disciplinary action taken by the Commissioner.
Aside from recommendations for disciplining a police officer, the most controversial recommendations from the PAB were for expungement of police department arrest, fingerprint, or photograph records in cases where charges had later been
dropped. From the point of view of a citizen, the existence of an unjustified arrest
record is particularly damaging and embarrassing. Therefore, the complainant often
was more interested in clearing his own name than in causing any sanction against
the arresting officer. There is some question, however, whether records can properly
be removed without a judicial orderP2
C. Complainants and Complaints
Data on characteristics of complainants to the boards in New York City and
Philadelphia also provide some interesting comparisons. Since the CCRB existed
for only four months, caution is required in interpreting these data. During the
period of the CCRB's operation, the poor did not utilize it to the extent expected s
Nevertheless, it appears that in both New York and Philadelphia civilian review
was used by members of minority groups. In both cities, non-whites were complainants more often than whites (Table I). Other data from Philadelphia indicate
that complainants came from the lower socio-economic strata of the population8 4
The bulk of complainants in both cities were male. Black reports that in New
York City males outnumbered females as complainants by a ratio of two to one;
in Philadelphia, the ratio was almost three to oneP 5
While no comparative data are available on arrest records of complainants, the
Philadelphia files reveal that about one-third of those initiating proceedings in that
city had previous police records. However, only about eight per cent of all complainants had ever been convicted of a felony. These data tend to refute the claim
that civilian review boards will be used mainly by habitual criminals.
In both cities unnecessary force was the most frequently alleged abuse (Table II).
The next most frequent complaint in New York City was discourtesy, and in
Philadelphia it was harassment. Abuse of authority in one form or another was
the third-ranked complaint.
In the four months the CCRB operated under civilian domination, approximately
44o complaints were filed with it. Of these, half were not processed before the
referendum removed the civilian members. The balance were disposed of as follows:
xo cases were outside the CCRB's jurisdiction and were referred elsewhere; 55 cases
were successfully conciliated; iio complaints were found to be unsubstantiated; 5
82

Harrington v. Tate, 435 Pa. 176, 254 A.ad 622 (1969).
"'N.Y. Tnes, Oct. 21, 1966, at z, col 7.
"' Hudson, supra note 49, at 21.

" Black, supra note 26,

at ioz.

LAw AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

TABLE I
RACE OF CmLIAN REviEw BOARD COMPLAINANTS
New York City'
White ........................................
Non-white ....................................
Totals
Percent ................................
Number ................................

Philadelphiab

49%
51

28%
72

100%
442

100%
868

aComputed from data in A. BLAcx, Tim PEoPLE AND THE POLICE, Appendix III (1968) for the four
months the CCRB was civilian-dominated.
bBased upon principal complainants for all incidents from 1958-1967.

TABLE II
ALLEGATIONS AGAINST POLICE OFFICERS INi NEw YoRx CITY AND PHILADELPHIA
New York CityUnnecessary Force ................
Discourtesy ......................
Abuse of Authority ...............
Ethnic Slur ......................

Philadelphiab
52%
23
20
5

Brutality
Harassment
Illegal Search and Seizure

45%
21
15
19

Other
Totals
Percent ....................
Number ...................

100%
442

100%
868

aComputed from data in A. BnL.&c, THE PEOPLE AND THE PoLICE, Appendix III (1968) for the four
months the CCRB was civilian dominated.
bBased upon principal complainants for all incidents from 1958-1967.

cases were sent to the Police Commissioner for action; and the remainder were

either still under investigation or awaiting review of the board 8 0
Table III indicates the resolution of PAB complaints. Hearings were conducted
for I6% of all cases, and of these approximately 35% resulted in recommendations
of discipline of the police officers. Informal settlements were employed in 20% of
the total cases. In 31% of all cases some resolution occurred, either disciplinary
recommendations, disciplinary action on the part of the police department, or informal settlements. It appears, then, that the PAB had an active role in the resolution
of a number of police-citizen altercations.
D. Legitimacy
Several additional comparisons between Philadelphia and New York City deserve
particular emphasis. The organizational differences between the PAB and the

CCRB, when it operated as a civilian review board, led to critical differences in their
activities and their image of legitimacy in the eyes of the police and the public.
Similarly, the defeat of civilian-dominated review systems left differing forms of
"' Interview with Algernon D. Black, former Chairman, N.Y.C. C.C.R.B., October 22, 1971.
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TABLE III
RESOLUTION OF COMPLAINTS

BRouGHT

To THE

PAB: 1958-1967

Disciplinary Action Taken by Police Department Without a PAB Hearing....

Determinations of PAB Hearings
Discipline of Police Officer Recommended .............................
Adjustment or Redress by Police Department to Complainant
Recommended ...................................................
No Recommendation ...............................................
Conciliation, Apology, Explanation or Other Action ........................
Complaint Withdrawn .................................................
Case Closed (Complainant or Police Officer
Not Available, Insufficient Information, etc.) ..........................
Case Open When PAB Abolished ........................................
Totals
Percent .........................................................
Number ........................................................

2%

6
3
7
20
12
33
17
100%
868

official machinery for discovery and resolution of citizen complaints against the
police.
In New York City the CCRB was created by shifting some authority from police
personnel to civilians within the existing structure for handling civilian complaints.
When the CCRB was defeated by the referendum, the changes in organization were
slight; the police simply regained control of the CCRB. 1
The CCRB, both during civilian domination and afteward, employed the entire
police organization for its intake apparatus. A directive prepared by the Commissioner detailed the manner in which complaints were to be allocated between
the units having authority to investigate them. The purpose of the order was to
insure that every member of the department appreciated his obligation to forward
the complaint to the appropriate unit. Under these rules, there was no characteristic
of a complaint that would justify a refusal to accept it. By checking with all units
having investigative jurisdiction, e.g., the CCRB and the Chief Inspector's Office,
the police command could ascertain the number of complaints made, the matters
complained of, the findings of the investigators, the manner of settlement, and any
other information based on intake forms and other case records.
The CCRB had a large staff and an investigating unit specifically assigned to
it; this provided good organizational conditions for investigating all complaints
in a professional manner and for completing all work on a given complaint in a
reasonably short time. In addition, two provisions of the rules helped to protect
an accused officer from damaging publicity or records, while allowing the department to check the validity of a complaint. Under the rules, hearings were not open
to the public, and no mention of CCRB proceedings appeared in a policeman's official
file.
The organizational characteristics of the CCRB had specific effects on the
accountability of the New York City Police Department to its citizens. At no time,
"'N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1966, at i, col. 5.
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including the period in which the CCRB was civilian-dominated, was the Board
external to the police department organization. Thus, a citizen desiring to complain
had to be willing to report to a branch of the department itself. Although members
of the New York City Police Department are required by the regulations of the
department to accept all citizen complaints, the extent to which this directive is
evaded cannot be determined. The skeptical citizen is not likely to accept the
assurances of the police command as to the accessibility of the system. There continues
to be no alternative, external police review system to receive complaints from individuals who prefer to avoid dealing directly with the police organization. Had
civilian domination endured, the Mayor's appointees might have been able to correct
any tendency toward bias in the investigations, to prevent superficial evaluations by
the Board, or to insure that Board findings were not ignored after they were
forwarded to the Police Commissioner.
As a result of the demise of civilian-dominated review, the police department as
an organization has essentially the same information about civilian complaints that
it had previously. Assuming that departmental decisions were not affected by the
presence of Board members appointed by the Mayor-something we cannot judge
-the main difference for the department between a civilian-dominated and policedominated GCRB may be the degree of confidence which citizens have in the review
system. Thus, some complaints which might have been taken to the civilian Board
may now be withheld because of distrust of the present Board. In addition, citizens
at large may have had more confidence in the whole department because of the
presence of civilians on the Board;
It may not be incidental that the campaign for civilian review coincided with
departmental efforts to improve the system for processing civilian complaints. The
internal system of the department, which in design is a well-structured, comprehensive
model, may be in part the result of pressures generated by the civilian review issue.
The relationship cannot be established with certainty, however, and perception of
it depends in part upon one's ideological position. On the other hand, some might
argue that the modifications produced no improvement in the system because they
operate to deflect justified criticism and thereby dilute the movement toward outside
review. At the other extreme, it might be suggested that the modifications were
ill-conceived because they draw valuable resources from the law-enforcement function of the department.
In Philadelphia, the PAB was created as a totally new and separate organization
attached to the Mayor as chief executive of the city government and tied organizationally to the police department only indirectly through the Mayor. Although there
was no formal connection between the PAB and the Philadelphia Police Department,
informal and indirect relationships did exist. For example, the PAB was provided
no source of investigations other than the department. Most complaints, therefore,
were sent routinely to the Community Relations Unit for investigation. In order
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to achieve informal settlement of complaints, it was usually necessary for the PAB
to deal with police officers, including those who had been accused and others in the
command structure or in special units. Finally, if a PAB hearing resulted in disciplinary recommendations, the matter would be forwarded through the Mayor to
the Police Commissioner for his consideration.
A citizen with a complaint against a policeman could have reported it to the
department directly, either to central headquarters or at a local precinct house.
Philadelphia Police Department records of disciplinary cases show that between i96o
and 1968 some officers were charged and found guilty of infractions of departmental
rules on the basis of citizen complaints. 8 There was, however, no arrangement
in Philadelphia which paralleled the New York City requirement that complaints
be received and forwarded by all members of the department. The normal response
of any bureaucrat is to handle matters for which he has been given instructions
and to avoid those which have not been defined by the organization as within its
jurisdiction. Therefore, many complaints that were processed in New York would
probably not have been accepted by individual members of the Philadelphia Police
Department because the manner for dealing with them had not been defined. This
is most likely the case with respect to complaints which in New York might have
been settled by conciliation between police officer and citizen-those that did not
appear to involve violation of the departmental rules. As we have noted, complaints
of the latter sort have been handled in Philadelphia, but have processed through
the formal departmental disciplinary channels. This departmental procedure presumably has continued in the absence of the PAB.
The Philadelphia experience with the PAB suggests a number of considerations
relevant to the issue of police accountability in that city. In the PAB, Philadelphia
did have an external police review board which accepted and settled citizen complaints. Its public image of legitimacy was marred, however, by inadequate staffing,
the most serious consequence of which was the absence of an investigating staff independent of the police department. The Board's legitimacy in the eyes of the
Department, on the other hand, was undermined by the fact that the Board's position
was external to the Department in that it was not subject to procedures promulgated
by the Police Commissioner. Specifically, officers felt threatened by public hearings
and suspected that being the subject of a PAB complaint was harmful to one's
career in the department. There was no guarantee that the result of PAB proceedings would not be entered in an officer's personnel file. Even if these particular
matters had been adjusted to provide greater protection to the individual officer, the
basic distrust of external review would have remained an issue for most members
of the department.
The demise of the PAB left Philadelphia with no official organization, internal
or external to the police department, specifically directed either to receive and
8

" Hudson, supra note 74-
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investigate civilian complaints against the police, or to advise the Commissioner as
to which complaints justify initiation of internal disciplinary proceedings. The function of the PAB in these areas has not been taken over by any one organization,
although it is likely that some complaints are now being handled satisfactorily by
the Mayor's Office of Information and Complaints, the Human Relations Commission, and units of the police department. As a result, it is particularly difficult
to know what complaints citizens have and what is being done about them.
There is no sign that the existence of the PAB or the protracted debate over its
desirability produced any reaction within the Philadelphia Police Department leading
to improvement of either its procedures for handling civilian complaints or policecommunity relations in general. Rank-and-file opposition to the PAB and, in recent
years, outspoken opposition from the top command, may have channeled energies
away from any effort to make organizational adjustments which would have increased the responsiveness of -the department. The general level of publicity surrounding the police review issue and particular investigations by the PAB may have
heightened the department's awareness of citizens' concern, particularly at the
command level. It cannot be documented, however, that this resulted in any substantial modification of departmental practices.
CONCLUSION

As pointed out in the introduction to this paper, the need for accountability is
not unique to police departments. But the recent efforts to establish efficient and
responsive police review boards in New York and Philadelphia bring into focus
the underlying problems facing any institution which makes such an attempt. Chief
among these problems is the difficulty of establishing a review mechanism which will
be acceptable to both the community and the professionals involved. The twopronged dilemma of legitimacy is rooted in the juxtaposition of beliefs held by the
officers-who feel they are being betrayed when operations are scrutinized by outsiders-and the citizens-who contend that the solidarity of the force effectively
precludes redress. Inducing confidence among the constituents in the system for
adjudication of grievances, while maintaining the trust and good will of the professionals, requires in the monitoring mechanism a delicate balance between suitable
impartiality toward the force and understanding of the policeman's difficult task.
The relative lack of success by New York and Philadelphia in creating an enduring review board previews the problems facing future endeavors to provide
channels of redress for citizens who feel their rights have been violated by a public
service agency. These problems can only be magnified during the delay since
polarization between citizens and service groups becomes more severe with time.

